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Criminals-Turned-Authors:
Victims' Rights v. Freedom of Speech
The growing number1 of books, magazine articles, interviews and other
forms of media presentations by those who have participated in crimes
has prompted a public outrage that such persons should be allowed to
reap voluminous profits as a result of their wrongdoing. The perception
that there is something unjust in allowing a person to profit from an act
which society condemns is strongest when the criminal act has resulted
in personal physical injury to an innocent person. While the victim and
his family- have suffered and may face increased expenses from medical
bills, the burden of loss of wages and support, or even the tragedy of loss
of life, the criminal becomes rich as a result of the crime.2 The media ex-
posure itself, in addition to the expectation of profits, is seen by some as
an incentive to would-be criminals to commit crimes.3
Society has responded in a variety of ways to the perceived injustice of
allowing criminals-turned-authors to profit from their crimes. These
responses include lawsuits initiated by members of the public to require
the criminal to disgorge his profits4 and statutes which redistribute the
profits by seizing them from the convicted person and making them
available to the victim of the crime and his dependents to cover expenses
'See, e.g., S. ATKINS, CHILD OF SATAN. CHILD OF GOD (1977); C. COLSON, BORN AGAIN
(1977); J. DEAN. BLIND AMBITION: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1976); H. R. HALDEMAN, THE
ENDS OF POWER (1978).
2When the wrongdoer in question is a public official who has betrayed the public trust,
committed an illegal act, and then published a book detailing the incident, the piblic could
be said to be the injured party whose trust has been violated and whose interests have
been neglected by the wrongdoer. Where government funds are necessary to remedy the
situation caused by the wrongdoing, every member of the public could claim injury. For ex-
ample, the thousands of dollars spent during the Watergate hearings in the Senate were
public funds.
3"By transforming a killer into a celebrity, the press has not merely encouraged but
perhaps driven him to strike again-and may have stirred others brooding madly over
their grievances to act." NEW YORKER. Aug. 15, 1977, at 21.
"We must take steps to make crime less attractive.... Press Release from the Office of
Assemblyman Jerry Lewis, February 27, 1978, at 2.
'See, e.g., Jenkins v. The New York Times Co., No. 3106-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Feb. 22,
1978). This suit, instituted by a New York secretary enraged by the fact that H. R.
Haldeman, former White House Chief of Staff under President Richard M. Nixon, was pro-
fiting from a book revealing his inside knowledge of the "Watergate" scandal gained while
he was a public servant, charges Haldeman with breach of trust and fiduciary duty owed to
the United States Government and its citizens. The plaintiff is seeking an injunction pre-
venting Haldeman from receiving any further pecuniary profit from the sales of the book,
THE ENDS OF POWER. and an accounting as to all moneys received prior to the suit. All such
moneys, and all future profits are to be paid into the General Treasury of the United
States.
For a variant of the theme of public injury resulting from the wrongdoing of a public ser-
vant and a request for disgorgement of profits see United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp.
176 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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incurred as a result of the crime. New York State enacted such a statute5
in 1977. The statute, drafted in response to media speculation about the
riches from publishing contracts awaiting the perpetrator of the "Son of
Sam" killings,6 requires those contracting with persons accused or con-
victed of certain crimes for the production of books, movies or other
specified media presentations regarding the crime to pay to the New
York State Crime Victims Compensation Board any moneys owing to the
accused or convicted person. The money is deposited in an escrow
account where it becomes available, upon conviction of the accused per-
son, to victims of crimes committed by that person who have recovered a
money judgment against the convicted person in a civil action.,
The New York statute (hereinafter referred to as the anti-profit statute)
raises several important questions regarding the constitutionality of
such statutory attempts to correct the perceived unjust enrichment by
means which have a significant impact on first amendment freedoms.
This note will analyze the statute in terms of the first amendment
rights of both the accused person and the other contracting party, and
will demonstrate that the statute, as enacted, is invalid. Potential due
process challenges to the statute will also be considered.
Since legislation similar to the New York statute has already been con-
sidered by at least one other state9 and will most likely be considered by
others in the future, it is imperative that the constitutional issues raised
by such a statute be discussed and resolved. It is the conclusion of this
note that, while the interests sought to be served by such a statute are
important and may even be considered by the courts to be compelling
enough to justify incidental intrusion on constitutional rights, the
statute in question is not narrow enough to serve only those valid in-
terests, and significantly encroaches on first amendment freedoms.
THE NEW YORK ANTI-PROFIT STATUTE AND ITS SETTING
The New York anti-profit statute, the title of which declares it to be
concerned with the "[djistribution of moneys received as a result of the
'N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1978). The statute, originally enacted in 1977,
was amended in 1978. However, none of the amendments remedied the basic constitutional
infirmities of the statute.
6In an interview in the New York Times, New York State Senator Emanuel Gold, spon-
sor of the bill, stated that "he developed the bill after reading a newspaper account during
the hunt for the 'Son of Sam' stating that the killer 'stood to get rich' and that there would
be people 'waiting at the precinct house to get him to sign a contract.'" N.Y. Times, Aug.
13, 1977 at 20, col. 3.
7N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
8Id.




commission of crime" 10 actually accomplishes two separate tasks. It both
prevents a criminal from receiving for his own use profits related in a
specified way to his crime and, in addition, provides for compensation to
victims of crimes committed by him. This latter goal of crime victim com-
pensation is not a new one." Several states, including New York, have
enacted statutes providing compensation to victims of crimes?
2
However, these statutes represent schemes of state compensation to vic-
tims and are based upon the premise that crimes represent a failure on
the part of the state to protect its citizens, thus leaving the state morally,
if not legally, bound to compensate those injured as a result of those
crimes. 13 The New York anti-profit statute providing for compensation
directly from the criminal is therefore quite different from traditional
crime victims compensation statutes. However, since both statutory
schemes do provide compensation to victims of crimes, the New York
anti-profit statute was included in the section of the New York Executive
Law dealing with the more traditional state crime victim compensation
system."'
For this reason, it is important in our analysis of the New York anti-
profit statute to understand the operation of the New York system of
state compensation to victims of crime, since by inserting the former
system in the midst of provisions of the latter system, the New York
legislature, whether intentionally or not,15 made some of the definitions,
"N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1978).
"Goldberg, Preface, Symposium-Governmental Compensation for Victims of Violence,
43 S. CAL L. REV. 1 (1970); Yarborough, The Battleground for a Federal Violent Crimes
Compensation Act! The Genesis of S.9, id. at 94-99.
"According to a report prepared for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
as of the end of 1976, 18 states had enacted victim compensation programs. They are:
Alaska, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
AND STATISTICS SERVICE. COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES: POTENTIAL COSTS OF
A NATIONAL PROGRAM (1977). Several foreign jurisdictions including New Zealand,
England, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland in Canada, and New South Wales and
Queensland in Australia, have also enacted such legislation. Goldberg, supra note 11 at
n.1.
"Yarborough, supra note 11, at 94.
'4The Crime Victims Compensation Board section of the.New York Executive Law is to
be found in N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978). The anti-profit
statute was added as § 632-a.
"5it is the opinion of the author that incorporation of definitions, procedures, etc. which
resulted from including the anti-profit statute in the middle of the New York Law's pro-
visions regarding state compensation to victims of crimes was unintentional, since some of
the provisions of §§ 620-35 of the Executive Law (the state compensation system) make
little or no sense in the context of § 632-a (the anti-profit statute). For example, § 620 is a
"[declaration of policy and legislative intent" regarding Article 22 which is entitled
"Crime Victims Compensation Board." Since part of Article 22 is § 632-a, one would
assume that the policy and legislative intent set forth in § 620 would be applicable to




procedures and restrictions of the state system apply to the anti-profit
statute.
The New York system of state compensation to victims of crime vests
power in a five-person board 16 to make awards to victims of crimes which
have resulted in personal physical injury to the victim.", The statute sets
out the criteria to be used in reaching these determinations, the basic
criterion for an award being "serious financial hardship" to the claimant
if an award is not made. 8 The original decision as to whether an award is
to be made is rendered by one member of the board to whom the claim has
been assigned by the chairman.19 The statute provides for review of this
decision by the full board 0 and by the Attorney General.
2 '
In cases where the victim has died as a direct result of such crime, a
surviving spouse, parent or child of a victim, or any other person depen-
dent for his principal support upon a victim of the crime is eligible for an
award.'2 Awards are to be made for reimbursement of "out-of-pocket ex-
The legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal
physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts. Such persons or their
dependents may thereby suffer disability, incur financial hardships, or
become dependent upon public assistance. The legislature finds and deter-
mines that there is a need for government financial assistance for such vic-
tims of crime. Accordingly, it is the legislature's intent that aid, care and sup-
port be provided by the state, as a matter of grace, for such victims of crime.
N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1972) (emphasis added).
The anti-profit statute does not provide for state aid to victims of crimes. Thus the
legislative intent and policy enunciated in § 620 clearly is not meant to apply to § 632-a
(unless one concludes that any system of compensation enacted by the state or ad-
ministered by the state is state aid, clearly a tortured definition of the term).
16N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 622 (McK"nmney Supp. 1978).
17N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978). "Personal physical injury" is not
defined in the statute, an omission which leaves open the question of whether mental pain
and suffering is including in the scope of the Statute. N. Y. EXEc. LAW § 621 (McKinney
1972).
18N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(6) (McKinney 1972).19Id. at § 627.
"Id. at § 628.
211 . at § 629.
121d. at § 624. The statute exempts from eligibility for an award any person "criminally
responsible for the crime upon which a claim is based or an accomplice of such person or a
member of the family of such persons .. k." I& at § 624(2). This exemption, which seems to
be directed at the prevention of collusion between criminals and their victims, has the un-
fortunate effect of making ineligible, for example, a wife who has been assaulted by her
husband. Whether concern about collusion in such situations is realistic is questionable,
and commentators have recognized that some alternative method for dealing with collu-
sion is necessary. See, e.g., Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal In-
jury, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 271, 276-77 (1965).
An even more bizarre result in excluding potential recipients of awards obtains because
of the definition of "family" for purposes of the statute. In § 621(4) of the law, "family" is
defined as follows:
4. "Family," when used with reference to a person shall mean (a) any person
related to such person within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. (b)
any person maintaining a sexual relationship with such person, or (c) any per-
son residing in the same household with such person. (emphasis added).
Subdivision (b) of that definition when taken in conjuction with § 624(2), results in ex-
empting from eligibility for awards those who maintained a sexual relationship with the
[Vol. 54:443
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penses, including indebtedness reasonably incurred for medical or other
services necessary as a result of the injury upon which the claim is based,
together with loss of earnings or support resulting from such injury."2"
An award may not exceed twenty thousand dollars unless the excess is
reimbursable from the federal government,2 4 and if more than one person
is entitled to an award as the result of the death of a victim, the Crime
Victims Compensation Board is to apportion the award among them.2 5
The perpetrator of the crime need not be apprehended, prosecuted or
convicted in order for an eligible person to apply for an award.2 6 This is
consistent with the underlying policy behind a system of state compen-
sation for victims of crimes since the state's duty to its citizens injured as
a result of lawlessness in the state is the same regardless of whether the
criminal has been apprehended. In addition, the victim is in the greatest
need of assistance when the perpetrator has not been found, since there is
therefore no one against whom to bring a civil action. Even if the alleged
perpetrator is found and convicted, the law does not require the victim to
obtain compensation from the criminal by a civil action. Any award
made, however, does subrogate the state to any right of action which the
recipient may have to recover losses resulting from the crime.2 7
The same Crime Victims Compensation Board which administers the
New York system of state compensation to victims of crimes also is the
governmental body with responsibility for administering the distribution
of funds under the anti-profit statute. The duties of the board in
administering the latter program are of a much less discretionary nature,
however, than their duties with respect to the former program. Under the
anti-profit distribution program, it is a third party, who is neither a
government official nor a victim nor criminally responsible for the
crime, who must take the first step toward the distribution of moneys to
perpetrator or his accomplice. Subdivision (b) is at the outset a vague provision, Le., what
comprises "maintaining a sexual relationship"? Is one act of intercourse enough? Even if
the vagueness problems were not present, the operation of this section would allow an
award to one girlfriend (who was otherwise eligible for an award) of a criminal who had
assaulted her, but preclude an award to another girlfriend assaulted with the same sever-
ity on the basis of her sexual relationship with the criminal. It is difficult to argue that the
possibilities of collusion are significantly stronger in the latter situation merely because of
the existence of a sexual relationship. Proving the existence of a sexual relationship and
using that information in an administrative hearing may also be violative of the right of
privacy of those applying for awards under the system.
Under subdivision (c) of the definition of "family," those residing in the household of one
criminally responsible for the crime would also be ineligible for awards. This exemption
would result in allowing an award to a next-door neighbor (perhaps a child of the
perpetrator or other eligible claimant) assaulted by a criminal, but denying an award to a
boarder in the household, hardly a distinction which appeals to one's sense of justice.
"N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 631(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
"Id at § 631(3).
"Id
26N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 627(3) (McKinney 1972).
27Id. at § 634.
19'79]
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the victim of a crime. For when a third party (be it a "person, firm, cor-
poration, partnership, association or other legal entity .'.,1) makes a
contract with a person accused or convicted 29 of a crime in New York or
with his representative or assignee "with respect to the reenactment of
such crime by way of movie, book, magazine article, tape recording,
phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment
of any kind, or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, ' 30 that
third party becomes duty-bound under the statute to pay any moneys
owing to the accused or convicted person under the contract to the Crime
Victims Compensation Board and to submit a copy of the contract to the
board.3 1 The board is to deposit the moneys in an escrow account for the
benefit of victims of crimes committed by the accused or convicted per-
son or the legal representatives of such victims.32 Distributions are made
only if the accused person is eventually convicted of the crime.3 3 In order
to receive a distribution, a victim must bring a civil action3 4 and recover a
money judgment against the criminal or his representatives within five
years of the date of the crime.3 5 The money in the escrow account can then
be used to satisfy the money judgment. The statute gives the board no
discretionary power to decide whether a distribution should be made to a
victim who has followed the proper procedures, and therefore the
criterion of "serious financial hardship" to the claimant,3 6 which guides
the board in its decisions regarding the granting of awards under the
system of state compensation is not operative under the anti-profit
distribution system. In order to insure that potential beneficiaries of the
18N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
"While the word "accused" is not defined in the statute, it probably would be construed
to mean a formal accusation resulting in a criminal indictment.
30N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).311d.
321da It is interesting to note that under the anti-profit statute, only victims of crimes or
their legal representatives appear to be eligible for distributions, while under the system of
state compensation to victims of crimes, when a victim has died as the direct result of the
crime, his spouse, children, parents, or others dependent for support upon the victim are
directly eligible to apply for awards. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.331d
'Id. It is unclear from the statute exactly what type of a "civil action" is contemplated,
If, for example, a victim of an assault and battery brings a civil action for damages for
assault and battery, the recovery might include not only out-of-pocket expenses for
medical treatment and loss of wages, but also damages for pain and suffering. The ques-
tion then becomes how much of that judgment can be satisfied from the escrow account,
given that the system of state compensation to victims of crimes limits awards to out-of-
pocket expenses, loss of earnings and loss of support. See supra note 23. Section 632-a is
technically a sub-program of the more general system of state compensation to victims of
crimes. Therefore are the limits on awards set forth in § 631 also applicable to distributions
under § 632-a, or can the total amount of a civil judgment be recovered under the anti-
profit statute?
3 According to § 632-a(4), this five year period for the bringing of a civil action does not
begin to run until an escrow account has been established.
"See supra note 18 and accompanying texL.
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escrow account are aware of its existence, the board is to publish legal
notices in newspapers in the county of the state where the crime was corn-
mited and contiguous counties once every six months during the five
year period to inform such persons of the fund.37 The board is to pay over
to the accused person any moneys in the escrow account upon dismissal
of the charges or acquittal 8 or upon a showing that the escrow fund has
been in existence for five years and that no actions are pending against
the criminal pursuant to the statute.3 9 During the five year period, if a
court of competent jurisdiction so orders, the board shall pay moneys
from the escrow account to the accused or convicted person after a
showing that the moneys are to be used for the exclusive purpose of re-
taining legal representation at any stage of the proceedings against him,
including the appeals process.
40
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE STATUTE
Protected Speech
The event which triggers the applicability of the anti-profit statute is
the making of a contract between two parties, one most probably a
member of the press or a publisher and the other a person accused or con-
victed of a crime in the State of New York, for the expression of the lat-
ter's "thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime" 41
or for the reenactment of the crime via certain specified forms of media
presentation.42 There are, therefore, potentially two first amendment
challenges to the statute, one by the party seeking to exercise his right to
speak and another by the person seeking to publish the speech of the
accused or convicted person. Whether either of these challenges will
prevail depends first upon whether the speech covered by the statute is
protected by the first amendment. While the purpose of the first amend-
31N:'Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978). If the crime was committed in a
county located in a city with a population of one million or more, notice by newspapers in
that city is sufficient. Id.
39Id- at § 632-a(3). The statute provides, however, that an accused person found not
guilty as a result of the defense of mental disease or defect pursuant to New York law is to
be deemed a convicted person. Id at § 632-a(5). This provision may itself raise constitu-
tional questions since it inflicts a punishment upon a person who has been found to lack
criminal responsibility for his act. According to New York law, a person cannot lawfully be
punished for an act committed by him while insane. People v. Whitman, 149 Misc. 159,266
N.Y.S. 844 (1933).391d.
40
1& at § 632-a(5).
"'I. at § 632-a(1). For a discussion ot a possible due process challenge to this wording in
the statute, see infra notes 106-115 and accompanying text.
"The contracts within the scope of the anti-profit statute are those "with respect to the
reenactment of such crime by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording,
phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any. kind. or
from the expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or
emotions regarding such crime ... " Id.
1 19791
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ment is "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources,' ",43 not all forms of speech have been
found by the Supreme Court to come under the protection of the amend-
ment. "[L]ibel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false
advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, con-
spiracy" 4 have all been found by the Supreme Court to be outside the
area of speech protected by the first amendment. Those areas excluded
from first amendment protection do nothing to advance the central goal
of the speech and press clauses of the first amendment: "to assure a
society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and wide open' public debate con-
cerning matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a society
can a healthy representative democracy flourish." 45 While the subject of
the speech covered by the anti-profit statute may be the commission of a
crime, and thus seen as unworthy of first amendment protection, the
statute is not limited in its scope to speech soliciting the commission of
crime. Thus the above-mentioned exclusions to speech protected by the
first amendment would not come into play to remove the speech from the
protection of the amendment. In fact, the speech covered by the statute,
which might include a criminal's delineation of how conditions in society
led him to commit a crime, his repentance and reform following the crime,
or his feelings and opinions about the criminal justice and penal systems,
appear to be subjects of great public interest and importance and within
the intended spectrum of speech sought to be protected by the first
amendment in the furtherance of its goal "to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.' ",46 Since the statute has an effect 47 not only on the
speech of persons eventually convicted of crime, but also on those who
have been accused of committing a crime but who are later acquitted, the
subject of the speech may also be an innocent accused person's denial of
his guilt, surely also a subject worthy of first amendment protection.
Nor should the facts that the speaker is a person accused or convicted
of a crime be seen as adequate grounds to withdraw the speech in ques-
tion from the protection of the first amendment. If the purpose of the
first amendment is to provide the public with information "from diverse
and antagonistic sources"48 to allow the public to make informed choices
about matters of public interest,49 then surely the view of one who is
directly involved in the criminal justice system is of value to the public in
4'Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (citations omitted).
"Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n. 10 (1961).
41424 U.S. at 93 n.127 (citations omitted).
41RL at 49 (citation omitted).
47See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
"1424 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
""Free discussion ... appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of
the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modem industrial society."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
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determining what leads people to commit crimes (a necessary piece of
knowledge for attempts to reduce the crime rate), and in efforts to im-
prove criminal justice and penal systems.
Infringement of First Amendment Rights
Once it is determined that the speech which is the subject of the anti-
profit statute is protected by the first amendment, one must then deal
with the question of whether the statute infringes upon the first amend-
ment rights of those persons affected by the statute: the accused or con-
victed person and the other contracting party. While there may well
be some question as to the constitutionality of the anti-profit statute as
applied to a person entering into a contract subject to the statute after
his conviction, this note will deal primarily with the first amendment
rights of persons accused of crimes and of the other contracting party.
Since the statute affects these two classes of persons in different ways,
the question of infringement on their first amendment freedoms will be
treated separately.
The anti-profit statute does not prohibit an accused person from
entering into a contract for the expression of his views regarding the
crime of which he is accused or from expressing those views on his own.
The statute controls the moneys owing to the accused person under any
contract made for the expression of those views. Regardless of the
disposition of the criminal charges, the statute requires the accused per-
son to be deprived of the use of the money due him under the contract at
least until final disposition of the charges. This deprivation infringes on
the accused person's right of free speech.
The Supreme Court has held in a variety of contexts that it is not
necessary for a statute to prohibit speech for that statute to be found to
impair a person's exercise of his right of free speech. 50 Recently in
Buckley v. Valeo,51 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional on first
amendment grounds a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 which restricted the amount of money a candidate could spend on
political communications. This statute did not prohibit a candidate from
airing his views by any method not involving the expenditure of money.
However, the Court found that the effect of the limitation on political ex-
50See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), in which a Los Angeles municipal or-
dinance prohibiting the distribution of handbills to pedestrians on the streets was found
violative of the first amendment, although the ordinance only prohibited distribution of in-
formation in certain places. See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) in which the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a municipal ordinance of Griffin, Georgia which
prohibited distribution of literature without the written permission of the city manager.
The Court in that decision stated: "The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to
distribution and not to publication. 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom
as liberty of publishing, indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little
value.'" (citation omitted) Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
51424 U.S. 1 (1976).
1979]
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penditures was an impermissible restriction on the candidate's freedom
of speech:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money.5"
Thus a statute which indirectly affects a citizen's ability to exercise his
first amendment rights by limiting the amount of money he can spend to
effectively communicate his views to others infringes on the citizen's
first amendment right of free speech.
The New York anti-profit statute, while it does not prohibit the amount
of money an accused person can spend in airing his views regarding the
crime, does remove from the use and possession of the accused person one
source of funds often used to defray expenses in preparing one's views for
dissemination, i.e., an advance against royalties paid to an accused per-
son pursuant to a publishing contract. Since in many cases, the accused
person will have no other source of funds to meet pre-publication costs
such as research and clerical costs, the advance against royalties
becomes particularly crucial to the accused person's ability to exercise
his first amendment rights.
3
Under the New York anti-profit statute all moneys owing to the
accused person54 under the contract must be paid to the Crime Victims
Compensation Board. Even in the case of an accused person who even-
tually is found not guilty and who therefore receives back the advance
against royalties previously held in the escrow account, the accused per-
son has lost the use of the advance for what could be a lengthy period of
time during which criminal charges are pending. This is the very period of
time when he has the greatest need of the advance and the greatest need
52Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
53p. WHITTENBERG, THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY PROPERTY 262-63 (1978). While some
might argue that freedom of speech is not denied by denying someone "freedom to have his
speech published," the Supreme Court has recognized that effective communication
depends upon widespread dissemination. In Associated Press v. United States, the Court
stated that the first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public .. " 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
More recently in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court re.cognized that:
Virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society re-
quires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or
leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs .... The electorate's in-
creasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensible
instruments of effective political speech.
424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (emphasis added).
"N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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for exercising his freedom of speech in his defense.
The Supreme Court has given some indication that a statute which has
the effect of depriving a person of the resources necessary for effective
speech may be violative of the first amendment. In Buckley v. Valeo,6
the Court rejected a first amendment challenge to a provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 197167 that restricted the amount any
one person or group could contribute to a candidate or political commit-
tee. The Court felt the restriction only marginally restricted the con-
tributor's first amendment right to express support for a candidate.5 8
However, the Court stated that a different constitutional question might
be presented if the effect of the expenditure limitation were to prevent
the candidate "from amassing the resources necessary for effective ad-
vocacy."59 Such a result, the Court commented, "could have a severe
impact on political dialogue. 60 It may be argued that in calling for the
seizure of the accused person's advance against royalties, the anti-profit
statute prevents that person from amassing the resources necessary for
effective speech. Thus the anti-profit statute infringes upon the accused
person's right of free speech.
The primary duty to act imposed under the New York anti-profit
statute is imposed not upon the accused person, but upon the other con-
tracting party, for by the terms of the statute it is that party who must
pay to the Crime Victims Compensation Board any moneys owing to the
accused person under the contract. This other contracting party will
most probably be a member of the press or a publisher, both of whom are
protected by the first amendment. Thus one must examine the effect of
the statute on these parties to determine whether their first amendment
rights are infringed by the statute.
It is unclear from the face of the statute whether any sanctions will be
imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the mandate of the
statute. Under the California version of the anti-profit statute,6 1 intro-
duced into the California State Assembly in February of 1978, the Crime
Victims Compensation Board is authorized and required to institute pro-
ceedings to recover money which should have been paid to it pursuant to
"While § 632-a(8) requires the Board to return money to an accused person for the "ex-
clusive purpose of retaining legal representation at any stage of the proceedings against
[him], including the appeals process," this provision would not allow money to be returned
to the accused person to help him meet expenses for the dissemination of his declaration of
innocence. One of the most disturbing aspects of the anti-profit statute is that an innocent
accused person's declaration of innocence is, under the wording of the statute, the accused
person's "thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime" and therefore
within the scope of the statute. I& at § 632-a(1).
56424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5718 U.S.C. § 608(b) (Supp. 1974).
"424 U.S. at 20-21.
9Id at 21.
alid.6'California Assembly Bill No. 2635, see supra note 9.
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the statute if the other contracting party fails or refuses to do so. 6 2 In
addition, if the other contracting party pays the money owing to the
accused person directly to the accused person rather than to the Board, a
penalty of twice the amount which should have been paid to the Board is
levied against the other contracting party.63 The penalty becomes a part
of the Crime Victims Assistance Account.6 4 While the New York statute
makes no explicit provision for enforcement of the statute, it is quite
probable that some regulatory mechanism would be devised to insure
compliance. If the other contracting party paid to the accused or con-
victed person money owing to him pursuant to a publishing contract, the
Board might still impose an obligation upon the contracting party to pay
a sum equal to that amount to the Board. Since the statute is vague in its
delineation of what contracts are to be affected by it,65 the statute not
only imposes the duty of paying certain moneys to the Board, but also of
determining exactly what moneys must be paid to it.
"Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or
traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on govern-
mental powers."6 6 The Supreme Court has found invalid as violative of
the first amendment several different types of statutes which, while they
did not directly restrict the press in its selection of material to publish or
in its mode of distribution, did indirectly have the effect of restricting the
right of the press in these areas. In Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc.
67
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute imposing a
license tax on the business of publishing advertising in publications with
a circulation of more than twenty thousand copies a week. Although the
statute did not prohibit any particular type of speech from being pub-
lished nor directly restrict the circulation of publications, the Court
found the tax an unconstitutional limit on freedom of the press because
the effect of the statute would be to limit the press' exercise of its first
amendment right by making widespread circulation more difficult (and
hence less attractive) by making it more expensive. The New York anti-
profit statute, by imposing on the press the duty of deciding when
moneys are to be paid to the Crime Victims Compensation Board and the
duty of actually paying such money to the Board makes the publication
of a certain category of articles or books more difficult (and hence less at-
tractive) for the press or book publishers. Rather than face the possible
problems which might arise from entering into a contract with a person
accused or convicted of a crime in New York, a publisher might avoid
62Id at § 1(b).
"I at § 1(/).
",Id
"See infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
"Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
67297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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such contracts altogether. "A free press stands as one of the great inter-
preters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered
is to fetter ourselves.
' 68
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,69 is another case in which the
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute imposing a rather unor-
thodox burden on the press. That case involved a challenge to a Florida
statute which grants a political candidate the right to equal space to
answer criticism and attacks on his record made by a newspaper. Failure
to comply with the statute was made a misdemeanor. The Court conclud-
ed that the statute was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of
the press because it subjected the press to a penalty based upon the con-
tent of a newspaper. The penalty consisted of the cost of printing the rep-
ly of the candidate and the loss of space used by the reply which other-
wise could be used for other material.70 Thus, the penalty was not a pro-
hibition of the publication of a certain type of material, the most blatant
restraint on freedom of the press, but instead the penalty made the
publication of certain subject matter less attractive to the press. This ef-
fect the court found impermissible. "Faced with the penalties that would
accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably
within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might well con-
clude that the safe course is to avoid controversy."7 ' Similarly, faced with
potential liability for moneys which should have been paid to the Crime
Victims Compensation Board, publishers might decide to avoid entering
into publishing contracts with persons accused or convicted of crime in
New York for publications regarding the crimes. Just as in the Miami
Herald case, this should be found to be an impermissible infringement on
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
First Amendment Analysis
Even if the New York anti-profit statute is found to infringe on the first
amendment rights of either the accused person or the other contracting
party, the statute may still be valid if it survives the "exacting
scrutiny"72 with which courts examine statutes which significantly en-
croach on first amendment freedoms. The Court must first examine the
state interest sought to be furthered by the statute. It is not sufficient
that the statute furthers some legitimate governmental interest." The
nature of the governmental interest which must be found has been
1I1 at 250.
6"418 U.S. 241 (1976).
701d at 256.
711&L at 257.





described by the Court in a variety of ways: compelling,74 substantial, 75
subordinating,76 cogent,"' strong.78 In Thomas v. Collins,79 the Court was
somewhat more explicit in describing the showing a state must make
with respect to its interest: "Only the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."80
Not only does the applicable constitutional analysis require that a com-
pelling interest be served by a statute infringing on first amendment
freedoms, but the state must demonstrate that the means employed are
necessary to the accomplishment of that interest, that no alternative




The New York anti-profit statute itself contains no declaration of
policy or legislative intent through the reading of which one might be cer-
tain of the interests sought to be furthered by the statute.82 Thus one
must examine the legislative history to determine what interests may be
served by the statutory scheme.
One interest proffered in support of a bill introduced in 1978 in the
California State Assembly with provisions similar to the New York
statute is the interest of the state in deterring persons from committing
crimes. In a press release announcing the introduction of the bill in the
California State Assembly, State Assemblyman Jerry Lewis is quoted as
stating "[wle must take steps to make crime less attractive and this
legislation is a step in the right direction .... -183 Quite clearly deterrence
of crime is within the police power of the state and of crucial enough im-
portance to be considered a compelling interest. However, it is not clear
that the anti-profit statute is even rationally related to the furtherance of
that interest. The deterrence argument, that by threatening to seize
profits from books an accused person might write the state is deterring
him from committing a crime, has at its basis the theory that the expec-
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
75NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 425, 444 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 464 (1958).
"Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
77I
"Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963).
79323 U.S. 516 (1945).
801d. at 530 (emphasis added).
"Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90
(1960).
"Article 22 of the New York Executive Law, which contains the entire scheme of crime
victim compensation for the State of New York does contain a declaration of policy and
legislative intent. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1972). However, this section was
enacted in 1966 when the system of state compensation to victims of crimes was enacted.
The declaration is clearly inapplicable to the anti-profit statute since it states that "[tlhe
legislature finds and determines that there is a need for governmental financial assistance"
for victims of crimes and that "it is the legislature's intent that aid, care, and support be
-,rovided by the state .... " Id (emphasis added).
"'Press Release from the Office of Assemblyman Jerry Lewis, February 27, 1978, at 2.
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tancy of profits from books and other forms of media exposure regarding
the crime is an operative incentive, inducing persons to commit crimes.
There is little support for such an assumption.
Even if one adheres to the deterrence theory in its basic form, i.e., that
the threat of punishment deters criminals from committing crimes,
' 4 it
does not necessarily follow that the anti-profit statute will have a deter-
rent effect. One of the criticisms of the deterrence theory in general is
that severity of potential punishment alone has little deterrent effect
unless there is a good likelihood that the criminal will be detected, pros-
ecuted and punished.85 Thus the variable of certainty affects the deter-
rent impact of a particular punishment. In the case of the anti-profit
statute, there are additional variables which may mitigate the deterrent
effect of the statute. For the statute to have any deterrent effect, the per-
son contemplating committing the crime must, before the crime, con-
template writing a book about it or capitalizing by some other media
presentation regarding the crime. It is questionable whether very many
criminals have such plans before the crime has been committed, or even if
they have considered such a possibility, that such plans, and the
likelihood of their success, are significant factors in their deliberations as
to whether or not to commit a crime. The statute will actually only affect
a criminal who has entered into a contract subject to the provisions of the
statute if the book or other media presentation is actually profitable, a
prediction which is difficult to make before the crime.8 6 In addition, while
the statute affects all accused persons who have money owing to them
under publishing contracts, the severest impact will be on persons who
are convicted and against whom victims have recovered money
judgments. Thus conviction and the ability of a victim to recover a
money judgment against the accused person are two more variables
which may lessen any deterrent effect the statute might have. Given all
'8There is even some question as to whether punishment of any kind has a deterrent
effect on would-be criminals:
[Tihe belief in the value of deterrence rests on the assumption that we are
rational beings who always think before we act, and then base our actions on a
careful calculation of the gains and losses involved. These assumptions, clear
to many lawyers, have long since been abandoned in the social sciences ....
Amongst criminals, foresight and prudent calculation is [sic] even more con-
spicuous by its [sic] absence ....
Gardner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment 21 MOD. L. REv. 115, 122 (1958).
,5 [C]ertainty, considered by itself, has a moderate deterrent effect for all
crimes, while severity acting alone is not associated with lower rates of crime.
When certainty and severity are combined.... then the impact of severity is
filtered through the certainty value. This means that increasing severity in a
condition of low certainty will have little effect on crime rates ....
Axtunes & Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications for
Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URBAN LAW 145, 158 (1973).
'"Before the crime, it is difficult to know whether the crime will proceed according to
plans. Any deviation from the anticipated course of events may make the story less suited
to a dramatic rendition.
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these variables, the deterrent effect of the anti-profit statute appears
negligible.
Even if one concludes that the statute has some deterrent effect, the
applicable constitutional analysis requires not only that the state
interest and the means be rationally related, but also that the means be
narrowly tailored to accomplish its purpose with the least possible intru-
sion on first amendment rights.8 7 Any interest the state might have in
deterrence would be satisfied by a statute that demonstrated that those
who committed crimes had profits seized for the benefit of their victims.
The statute as written sweeps more broadly, however, and punishes
those who are accused of crimes and later exonerated by seizing their pro-
fits as well and holding them until final disposition of the charges.8 At
the very least, the scope of the statute must be narrowed to only affect
those actually convicted of a crime.8 9
Another interest which the state may assert in support of the statute is
an interest in punishing the reprehensible conduct of the criminal in (1)
committing the underlying crime, or (2) in seeking to profit from that con-
duct by some form of media presentation. Since punishment already
exists for the underlying crime, it is questionable whether an interest in
increasing that punishment would be deemed a significant state interest,
absent a showing that the already existing punishment is insufficient. If
such a showing were made, the means chosen to increase the punishment
should affect all persons convicted of such crimes. The New York anti-
profit statute, in addition to being over-inclusive in affecting those
accused of crimes who are later vindicated" is also underinclusive in that
it affects only those criminals who have contracted for the production of
some media presentation regarding the crime. Thus the statute cannot be
justified on the basis of punishing those who have committed crimes
resulting in personal injury to mnocent victims, since it only punishes
those who have committed such crimes and then contracted to tell about
them for profit.
The state may see the attempt to profit from one's crime as such a
81"[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
may not be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). In Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 n.8 (1971), the Supreme Court stated:
"This standard ... has been carefully applied when First Amendment interests are in-
volved."
08N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a{1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
89The argument that by including all accused persons within its scope the statute is un-
necessarily broad and must be narrowed to affect only convicted persons is applicable
regardless of what interest is asserted by the state in support of its statute, since there
could be no valid interest in affecting those ultimately vindicated of any wrongdoing.
9 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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reprehensible act that the criminal should be punished for undertaking it.
While such profit does not appeal to one's sensibilities as particularly
praiseworthy, neither is the problem of a sufficient magnitude to qualify
as one of the "gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, [which]
give occasion for permissible limitation"91 when first amendment rights
are involved.
If the purpose of the New York anti-profit statute is punishment, the
statute does not comport with one of the basic objectives of a penal
system, proportionality of punishment to the severity of the crime.
"When two offenses come into competition, the punishment for the
greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.
'92 If
the principle of proportionality were followed in the anti-profit statute,
then regardless of whether what is being punished is the underlying
crime or the act of the person in telling about it for profit, the effect of the
statute on an accused person should depend upon the seriousness of his
actions. While the anti-profit statute does affect accused persons with
differing severity, the intensity of punishment does not depend on the
reprehensibleness of the .conduct in which the accused person was
engaged. A well-written, thought-provoking book about a less severe
crime may produce more royalties than a boring, badly written, poorly
marketed book about a more severe crime. In such a case, the accused
person who has committed the less severe crime will be punished (by loss
of profits) to a greater extent than the person who has committed the
more severe crime. One might consider a book by a criminal telling of his
repentance about committing his crime and his rehabilitation or a book
by an accused person asserting his innocence as less reprehensible than a
book by a convicted person dramatically recounting the events surroun-
ding his crime in a sensationalistic manner. The statute makes no di§tinc-
tion among these various types of media presentations in determining
the severity of the punishment. All contracts for the "expression of such
accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions
regarding such crime"93 are subject to the statute regardless of whether
those feelings and emotions are of repentance for one's actions or of pride
in them. The statute is therefore not sufficiently narrowly drawn to
accomplish any state interest based upon punishment.
94
91Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
922 J. BENTHAM, Principles of PenalLaw, Part II, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 400
(J. Bowring ed. 1838).
91N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
"The statute imposes another penalty on the accused person in addition to the seizure of
his profits. As in the case of the seizure of profits, this additional penalty does not have an
effect on the accused person which is proportional to the gravity of his actions.
The procedure by which a victim can receive the funds held in the escrow account is to
bring a civil action and recover a money judgment against the accused person within five
years of the date of the crime. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978). The
money in the escrow account can then be used to satisfy the judgment. No particular form
of civil action is specified in the statute. Therefore one assumes an ordinary tort action for
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A third interest which the state may claim is furthered by the statute is
the state's interest in aiding victims of crimes. While such an interest is
indeed a significant one, New York already has a system for providing
compensation to victims of crimes.95 The anti-profit statute has for its
beneficiaries the same persons who are already eligible for aid under the
system of state compensation to victims of crimes96 The state system of
crime victims compensation is in fact much broader in scope than the
anti-profit statute, and the former therefore serves the interest of crime
victims compensation more effectively than the latter. Under the system
of state compensation, a victim may apply for an award even if the
perpetrator of the crime remains unapprehended, where under the anti-
profit statute, compensation can be obtained only (1) from the
perpetrator, (2) after his conviction, and (3) after a money judgment has
been obtained in a civil action. The state system fulfills the greater need
in the area of victim compensation, since it is when the perpetrator
remains unapprehended that the victim, having no one against whom to
recovery of damages suffered as a result of the personal physical injury is comtemplated
by the statute. Since the New York statute of limitations for intentional torts is 1 year,
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 215(3) (McKinney 1972), the anti-profit statute explicitly extends the
statute of limitations to five years, exposing the accused person to civil liability for a
longer period of time than other citizens who have committed similar torts. This is most
certainly a penalty imposed on the accused person because of his exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms.
In order to prevent the accused person from avoiding the effects of the statute by
waiting until the five year limitations period has lapsed before contracting for the produc-
tion of a media presentation regarding the crime, the anti-profit statute contains the
following provision: "Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the civil practice law
and rules with respect to the timely bringing of an action, the five year period provided for
in subdivision one of this section shall not begin to run until an escrow account has been
established." N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(7) (McKinney Supp. 1978). This provision suspends
the tolling of the statute of limitations indefinitely, for if a person is convicted of a crime,
serves the sentence imposed upon him on conviction, is rehabilitated, lives a productive
life, and thirty years after the crime contracts to write a book about his life and the effect
of the crime upon that life, the victim of that crime would then have five years, thirty-five
years from the date of the crime, to bring a civil action against the convicted person. The
statute is not clear as to the status of any money judgment obtained pursuant to the provi-
sion cited above, ie., whether a judgment obtained during this extended period of limita-
tions may only be satisfied from the escrow account or whether it stands on the same
footing as an ordinaryy money judgment which may be satisfied from the general assets of
the person against whom it was obtained. Whatever the status of the judgment, it
significantly penalizes the convicted person who chooses to contract for the production of
a media presentation regarding the crime. The penalty is not directly related to the
reprehensibleness of the convicted person's conduct, for the suspension of the tolling of
the statute of limitations occurs regardless of the severity of the underlying crime and
regardless of the amount of time which has elapsed since the commission of the crime of
the actual content of the media presentation itself. For a judicial affirmation of the exten-
sion of the statute of limitations produced by the statute, see Barrett v. Wojtowicz,
-Misc. 2d_, 404 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1978).
"N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1978).
96The word "victim" which is used in § 632-a, the anti-profit statute, to describe those for
whose benefit the escrow account is to be established is defined in § 621(5) for the purposes
of article 22 of the Executive Law which includes both the anti-profit statute and the
system of state compensation.
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bring a civil action, needs some alternative source of aid. The anti-profit
statute is of marginal help to victims, aiding them only in recovering a
previously obtained civil judgment. The state system is broader, too, in
its definition of those eligible to receive awards since it allows a surviving
spouse, parent or child of a victim who has died as a direct result of a
crime, or other person dependent for support on the deceased victim to
receive awards for loss of support. Under the anti-profit statute, only vic-
tims9 7 of crimes or their legal representatives are eligible to receive
moneys from the escrow account. Given the broader provisions of the
system of state compensation to victims of crimes, it is difficult to see the
necessity, in terms of aid to victims of crimes, of the anti-profit statute.
If the limitation on the size of awards is held not to apply to
disbursements made pursuant to the anti-profit statute, the state may
assert that the anti-profit statute increases the amount of compensation
which some victims may receive to defray expenses incurred because of
injuries suffered as a result of a crime.98 It should be noted that the anti-
profit statute will only serve this interest with respect to one relatively
small sub-group of victims: those victims who were victimized by persons
who have been apprehended, convicted, and who have contracted for the
production of some media presentation regarding the crime.9 The state
may argue that the statute may deal with the problem of adequate com-
pensation to victims of crimes in a piecemeal fashion, since
[The Supreme] Court has frequently upheld underinclusive
classifications on the sound theory that a legislature may deal
with one part of a problem without addressing all of it ....
This presumption of statutory validity, however, has less force
when a classification turns on the subject matter of expression.
"[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content .... 100
The anti-profit statute classifies the speech which is subject to its pro-
visions in terms of the subject matter of that speech. Therefore, the or-
dinary presumption that an underinclusive classification in a statute is
valid may not be operative to justify the underinclusiveness of the
'TSee supra note 322 and accompanying text.
"N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978). It is unclear from the face of the anti-
profit statute whether the limitation on the size of awards which is provided for in the
system of state compensation to victims of crime is also applicable to disbursements made
pursuant to the anti-profit statute. If the limitation is applicable, then the anti-profit
statute would not provide victims with any additional funds, since any awards made by
the system of state compensation must be reduced by any amount received "from or on
behalf of the person who committed the crime."
"The eligible claimants, it should be noted, include not only victims of the crime which is
the subject of the media presentation, but also victims of other crimes committed by the
accused. For objections to that category of claimants, see infra notes 101-02 and accompa-
nying text.
1'°Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) (citations omitted), quoting
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971) (emphasis added).
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statute. Thus, it may be impermissible, both under the equal protection
clause, as well as the first amendment, for the state to attempt to in-
crease the amount of money available for crime victims compensation by
singling out and seizing only one source of funds, profits made by con-
victed persons, a source dependent upon the exercise of their first amend-
ment freedoms.
Another possible interest which may be offered by the state in
justification of the anti-profit statute is the correction of the fundamental
unfairness of allowing a convicted person to profit from a media presen-
tation regarding a crime, while the victim suffers hardship as a result of
the crime. Thus the statute may be seen as channeling profits from the
media presentation to the victim because the profits in some respect
belong (or should belong) to the victim since they are derived from an
event in which he owns some type of proprietary or equitable interest.
The statute, however, is not drawn narrowly enough to express only that
interest.101 According to the statute, not only may the victim of the crime
which is the subject of the media presentation obtain money from the
escrow account, but all victims of other crimes committed by the accused
person may obtain money from the escrow account if the other re-
quirements of the statute are met. 02 These other victims obviously have
no proprietary or equitable interest in profits from the media presenta-
tion regarding another crime committed by the accused person. Thus the
statute is not drafted to narrowly transfer an interest in the profits to the
victim of the crime which is the subject of the media presentation.
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO THE STATUTE
The anti-profit statute is also subject to constitutional challenges
brought by both the accused person and the other contracting party on
the ground that the statute violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Under the statute, the primary responsibility for
determining when money owing to an accused person need be paid to the
Crime Victims Compensation Board is placed by the statute upon the
other party to the contract. Given the vague language of the statute
0 3
regarding the contracts which are subject to the statute, the determin-
ation as to exactly when moneys must be paid to the Board is a difficult
one, which may be erroneously made. The New York statute provides no
procedure by which an accused person whose profits have been paid to
the Crime Victim Compensation Board may challenge that action on the
grounds that the conduct giving rise to the profits was not within the
1"'See supra note 87.
"'N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
'3For a discussion of the possible due process vagueness challenge to the statutes, see
infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
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bounds of the statute. 04 Thus the statute gives power to a private citizen
to make the determination as to whether the accused person is to have
the use of his money or whether it should be turned over to the govern-
ment for the benefit of others. Such a statutory scheme most certainly in-
volves the taking of the accused person's property without due process of
law. 105
Furthermore, it is unclear whether any sanction may be imposed upon
a party who does not remit to the Board moneys which should have been
so remitted. However, it is quite possible that, in order to make the
statutory scheme work, some form of penalty might be imposed upon a
contracting party who does not comply with the statute. 0 6 At the very
least, the contracting party may be liable to the state for the amount of
money that should have been paid to the Board. Given this possibility,
the statute becomes analogous to a criminal statute in that it attaches a
penalty to a course of conduct (or deviation from a course of conduct)
which is defined by statute. The due process clause requires that the
definition of proscribed conduct be clear and specific enough that men of
common intelligence are not required to guess at the meaning of the
enactment. 0 7 There are several reasons why such specificity is required.
If one assumes that citizens shape their conduct in such a way as to steer
clear of unlawful conduct, laws must be defined clearly enough to guide
citizens in choosing lawful rather than prohibited activity.10 8 Laws which
are vague and do not clearly define proscribed conduct also lead to the
possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by those charged
with such a duty.0 9 In cases where a vague statute prohibits conduct
which" 'abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic first amendment freedoms,'
it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.' Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to ' "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone" ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly mark-
ed.' "0 This last effect of vague statutes is perceived as such an
undesirable result that when vague laws deal with an area "permeated by
first amendment interests" ' a very high degree of specificity of
"'The proposed California anti-profit statute, Bill No. 2635(c), introduced in the Califor-
nia Assembly in 1978, provides for a judicial determination as to whether sums received by
the board shall be held by the board. All interested parties, including the accused person
are permitted to present evidence at such hearing.
"'Bill No. 2635 was a revised version of a bill on the same subject introduced the year
before in the California legislature. The earlier bill did not provide for the hearing process
to determine the propriety of the Board's retaining the accused person's profits and was
therefore attacked on due process grounds. Press Release from the Office of Assemblyman
Jerry Lewis, February 27, 1978, at 1.
'"See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
1"Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
"o'IM
"Id at 109 (footnotes omitted).
"'Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1. 41 (1976).
1979]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
language is required before a statute will be allowed to stand."'
The language in the anti-profit statute which describes the types of
contracts which come within its purview is subject to a due process
vagueness challenge. The other contracting party is directed to pay to
the Crime Victims Compensation Board moneys owing to the accused
person under contracts "with respect to the reenactment of such crime,
by way of a movie, book, magazine, article, tape recording, phonograph
record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or
from the expression of such person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emo-
tions regarding such crime. .... ,,11 The other contracting party may en-
counter several difficulties in determining according to this language
when moneys must be paid to the Crime Victims Compensation Board,
and if so, how much should be paid.
One is faced with the difficult task of defining the limits of the phrase
"the expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings,
opinions, or emotions regarding such crime." Exactly, how narrowly or
broadly is the phrase "regarding such crime" to be read? If the accused
person recounts his childhood experiences and relates them to his com-
mission of the crime, is the entire discussion "regarding such crime"? If a
person writes a book or magazine article denying that he has committed
any crime, are his words to be interpreted as his opinion regarding the
crime? If a person criticizes the criminal justice system and uses as an ex-
ample the handling of his case, are his opinions to be considered opinions
"regarding such crime"? It is evident from these hypothetical questions,
that a wide variety of conduct might fit the nebulous description of ex-
pression which will bring a contract within the purview of the statute.
Whether or not a particular type of expressive conduct is meant to sub-
ject a contract to the requirements of the anti-profit statute is unclear,
given the vague language of the statute.
The other contracting party also faces the dilemma of determining how
much money must be remitted to the Crime Victims Compensation
Board. For example, if a convicted person contracts to write his life story,
and only one of the ten chapters mentions the crime, must all the money
owing to the convicted person be paid to the Board or only one-tenth of
the money? The language of the statute imposes a duty on persons con-
tracting for specified conduct and mandates that moneys owing to the
person "by terms of such contract" shall be paid to the Board. If a con-
tract concerns more than one subject, must all money to be paid to the ac-
cused person be remitted to the Board or only money which can be at-
tributed to the conduct specified by the statute?
14
'1Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 2-78, 287-88 (1961); Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
13N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
'That this entire discussion has been framed in terms of questions illustrates the imper-
missible vagueness of the statute.
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Given the vagueness of language, a contracting party has very little
guidance as to what types of contracts are subject to the statute. To
avoid any possible liability for not remitting moneys to the Board when it
had the responsibility to do so, a publisher might very well refrain from
entering into any publishing contracts with persons accused of crimes.
Such avoidance of conduct which may be constitutionally protected in
order to steer clear of conduct which is the subject of the statute is
exactly the type of "chilling effect" '115 which is sought to be eliminated by
holding vague statutes unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The New York anti-profit statute infringes upon the first amendment
freedoms of both the accused person and the other contracting party.
Several state interests which might be asserted by the state as com-
pelling enough to justify infringement of first amendment rights have
been discussed, and the statute has been analyzed with reference to these
interests. All of these interests are either already being adequately
served by the state without the aid of the anti-profit statute or can be
served by alternative means which do not have such a significant impact
on first amendment freedoms. To deprive the accused person of the abil-
ity to express his views and to fetter the other contracting party with
such burdensome responsibilities that it will avoid publishing the speech
of the accused person penalizes not only the accused person and the other
contracting party, but also society as a whole. "In the traditional theory,
freedom of expression is not only an individual but a social good. It is, to
begin with, the best process for advancing knowledge and discovering
truth."116
Challenges to the statute on the basis of violation of the due process
clause have also been discussed. The method by which the accused per-
son's money is siphoned to the escrow account amounts to deprivation of
property without due process of law. The other contracting party may
also challenge the statute on the ground that the wording of the statute is
impermissibly vague in violation of the due process clause.
While the anti-profit statute might be seen as a basically laudable
attempt to correct the injustice of allowing a criminal to profit by a crime
which has resulted in injury to an innocent person, the constitutional
challenges presented herein demonstrate that the effects of the statute
may ultimately harm rather than protect society, for "the right of all
members of society to form their own beliefs and communicate them




' 1Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
"OEmerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881
(1963).
17Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
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